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Abstract 
The aim of this study consists in providing the first empirical evidence for the companies listed in Romania regarding the 
influence of financial intermediaries’ ownership on firm value. The empirical research was carried out for a sample of 
companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE), over the period 2007-2011, being estimated multivariate 
regression models for panel data, unbalanced, with fixed effects. The companies’ value was measured through Tobin’s Q 
ratio, but adjusted in order to account for the industry membership diversity of the selected companies. We considered the 
ownership of the five Romanian Financial Investment Companies (SIF-s), the ownership of the Investment Funds and 
Financial Investment Service Companies (SSIF-s), as well the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial 
intermediaries, including in the last the Property Fund (FP) ownership, but only for 2011, when the Romanian Government 
became minority shareholder. The results provide support for a positive influence of the five Romanian Financial 
Investment Companies on firm value, but up to an ownership threshold of 23.71 percent, whereupon the influence becomes 
negative. By considering the ownership of the Investment Funds and Financial Investment Service Companies, we 
identified a positive influence on firm value. Further, the results provide support for a positive influence of the sum of 
shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries on firm value, but up to an ownership threshold of 50.3 percent, 
whereupon the influence becomes negative. Therefore, down to the identified ownership thresholds we could validate the 
active monitoring hypothesis according to which there are sufficient incentives inside of financial intermediaries in order to 
oversee corporate performance 
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1. Introduction 
Like Eastern and Central European countries, after 1989, in Romania was set the legal framework in order to 
convert the State-owned companies out of the communist regime into commercial companies or autonomous 
administrations. The privatisation process of the entirely State-owned companies until that time stipulated that 
a ratio of 30 percent of the State ownership in the companies incorporated according to the new legislation have 
to be transferred to five Regional Funds of Private Property (SIF-s). As well, the remaining ratio of 70 percent 
was maintained in the State ownership, being managed by the State Property Fund. Thus the State Property 
Fund and five Regional Funds of Private Property were established in order to monitor and support the 
privatisation process, actually still incomplete. Also, in 2005, the Romanian Government founded the Property 
Fund (FP) with the aim of ensuring the required financial resources in order to indemnify those individuals 
improper expropriated during the communist regime. Besides, Romania was the sole country from Eastern 
Europe which tried to find a solution in order to return at the fair value the seized properties. As much, the 
compensation consisted in share distribution representing the real value of the real estates which were not 
returned in nature. The Property Fund is a joint stock company which is operating as a closed-end fund 
incorporated in Romania and listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) since January 2011. Initially, the 
Romanian State was the exclusive shareholder of the fund, but through apportionment of the shares primary 
owned to the eligible petitioners, the Government of Romania became minority shareholder. 
Therefore, we distinguish the following categories of shareholders within the ownership structure of the 
companies listed on the BSE: corporate insiders (represented by the CEO, board of directors, and executive 
management team), financial intermediaries (the five Romanian SIF-s, Investment Funds, Financial Investment 
Service Companies (SSIF-s), and Property Fund, the last since 2011, when the Romanian Government became 
minority shareholder), Romanian State (represented by the Resort Ministries, Authority for Capitalization of 
the State Assets (AVAS), and Property Fund, the last over the period 2007-2010, when the Romanian 
Government was majority shareholder), employees of the companies through the Employees’ Organisations 
(PAS).  
The aim of this study consists in providing the first empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
financial intermediaries’ ownership and firm value, by using a sample of companies listed on the BSE, over the 
period 2007-2011. Therefore, consistent with most of the corporate governance literature, we proxy the value 
of firm by industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio. Besides, in order to measure financial intermediaries’ ownership 
we consider separately the shareholdings of the five Romanian SIF-s, as well the shareholdings of the 
Investment Funds and SSIF-s. Additionally, we consider the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial 
intermediaries.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the results of previous studies, being 
emphasized the theories regarding the relationship between institutional ownership and firm value, while 
Section 3 describes the sample and the employed methodology. The empirical results and discussion are 
presented in Section 4. A summary of the paper and concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. 
2. Literature review 
In most cases, the issues related to the principal-agent relationship occur if managers hold incentives in 
order to achieve their own personal goals notwithstanding the existence of shareholders. Therefore, there are 
several corporate governance mechanisms which could diminish this shortcoming. Thus, a conspicuous 
corporate governance mechanism is underlined by the institutional ownership which lead to the improvement 
of the managerial process of monitoring and firm performance. Institutional investors are large organizations, 
such as banks, insurance companies, retirement funds, hedge funds, investment advisors, and mutual funds 
which have considerable cash reserves that need to be invested. They are participating at the disciplinary 
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process with respect to the management, thus restricting the free rider problem related to the dispersed 
ownership. Besides, institutional investors fulfil a role of corporate monitors. However, by considering the fact 
that the monitoring costs are higher, only significant shareholders such as institutional investors could acquire 
satisfactory returns in order to hold the monitoring incentive. Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988 pointed out two 
types of institutional investors, respectively pressure-sensitive institutional investors (e.g., banks and insurance 
companies) who have business relationships with the firms and pressure-insensitive institutional investors (e.g., 
unit trusts, pension funds, and State-owned institutions) with no business relationships with the companies. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003 active monitoring hypothesis highlights 
the fact that institutional investors hold incentives in order to oversee corporate performance. Therefore, the 
benefits of institutional investors are higher than those of minority shareholders, whereas due to the meaningful 
voting power, the first could uphold corrective measures towards management. Monks and Minow, 2001 
argued that this circumstance is conformable with the perception according to which institutional investors 
unfold all the required activities in order to shelter the value of their assets, including the monitoring of the 
companies in which they invest. Hartzell and Starks, 2003 support the fact that institutional investors could 
alleviate the agency problem between managers and shareholders, the institutional ownership concentration 
being positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation and negatively 
associated with the level of executive compensation. The opposite perspective is described by the passive 
monitoring hypothesis which holds that institutional investors own reduced incentives in order to unfold an 
active monitoring process as against management. 
Pound, 1988 noticed both a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm value (the 
efficient monitoring hypothesis) and a negative relationship (the conflict of interest hypothesis and the strategic 
alignment hypothesis). According to the efficient monitoring hypothesis, institutional investors are more 
knowledgeable, thus having the ability to monitor management at lower costs than minority shareholders. On 
the other hand, the conflict of interest hypothesis emphasizes the fact that institutional investors could have 
gainful business relationships, current or potential, with the firms within they hold shares, thus being less 
interested in limiting the managerial discretion. Likewise, the strategic alignment hypothesis underlines the fact 
that institutional investors and managers recognize a mutual benefit in the sense of cooperation. Nevertheless, 
through the aforementioned cooperation there occurs an impairment of the monitoring function related to the 
institutional investors. McConnell and Servaes, 1990 ascertained a positive relationship between the 
institutional ownership and Tobin’s Q ratio, thus supporting the efficient monitoring hypothesis proposed by 
Pound, 1988. Han and Suk, 1998 identified a positive relationship between stock returns and institutional 
ownership, motivating the role of institutional investors in the active monitoring process towards management. 
Davis, 2002 stated that the proportions of equity held by institutional investors raised across all OECD 
countries, showing a higher influence inside of the corporate governance specific structures and a positive 
influence on firm performance. There resulted that within Anglo-Saxon countries the institutional investors 
express a disciplinary role regarding management. 
Contrariwise, David and Kochhar, 1996 specified that institutional investors despite their ability in dropping 
the managerial power, there are several barriers which reduce this efficiency as follows: business relationships 
with the companies in which they invest, excessive government regulations which constrain their activities, and 
restrictions of the information-processing skills, required in order to monitor the companies. Leech, 2000 
argued the fact that institutional investors are not evermore willing to exert control in the companies within 
they hold shares. This incident could emerge due to the presumption of investor gaining information which 
would compromise his share trading activities and risk him committing a misdemeanor of insider trading. 
Thereby, the shareholders seek power in the form of influence rather than control. 
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3. Data description and estimation framework 
3.1. Sample formation and variables construction 
The empirical research is employed for a sample of companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange 
(BSE), at the three tiers, over the period 2007-2011, respectively 63 companies in 2007, 67 companies in 2008, 
and 68 companies over the period 2009-2011, summing-up 334 statistical observations. We did not include in 
our sample the financial intermediaries, respectively the credit institutions, the five SIF-s, and SSIF-s, 
inasmuch as the activity of these companies is based on specific regulations. Besides, our sample did not 
comprise the companies which were delisted due to non-fulfilment the criteria of performance, efficiency, 
reporting, and disclosure but whose shares are traded through the electronic systems of the BSE, comprised at 
the ‘Unlisted’ tier. Moreover, we did not include the companies listed at the ‘International’ tier. The industry 
membership is varied as follows: wholesale/retail, construction, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, plastics, 
machinery and equipment, metalurgy, food, chemicals, basic resources, transportation and storage, tourism, and 
utilities. Information about financial intermediaries’ ownership comes from the BSE webpage. Financial 
information comes from the Annual Reports of the companies. All the data were hand-collected. 
We considered several variables in order to measure firm value, financial intermediaries’ ownership, and 
control variables. Table 1 summarizes all the variables used in this paper and their description. 
Table 1 Description of  the selected variables 
Variable  Description 
Variable concerning firm value 
Q_Adj 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio. Tobin’s Q ratio was computed as the market value of assets divided by 
the book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity. 
Variables concerning financial intermediaries’ ownership 
SIF_Share The ownership of the five Regional Funds of Private Property (SIF-s) (%). 
SSIF_Share The ownership of the Investment Funds and Financial Investment Service Companies (SSIF-s) (%). 
FinIntermed_Shar e 
The sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries (the five SIF-s, Investment Funds 
and SSIF-s, and Property Fund (FP), the last only for 2011) (%). 
Control variables 
Ln(TotalAssets) Firm size, as total assets (logarithmic values).  
Leverage Leverage, computed as debt/book value of assets.  
ǻSales Sales growth, as the relative increase of sales from the previous year (%).  
YearsListed Number of years since listing on the BSE (logarithmic values). 
 
The value of the companies is measured through Tobin’s Q ratio, by considering the specification similar to 
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009. Consistent 
with the studies undertaken by La Porta et al., 2002; Doidge, Karoly, and Stulz, 2004; Gozzi, Levine, and 
Schmukler, 2008 we did not consider the market value of debt at numerator, respectively the replacement cost 
of assets at denominator. After we have computed the Tobin’s Q ratio for each company from the selected 
sample, we decided to adjust the obtained values based on the industry membership, similar Eisenberg, 
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Sundgren, and Wells, 1998 due to the industry membership diversity. Therefore, the difference between 
Tobin’s Q ratio corresponding to a company from a certain industry and the median of Tobin’s Q ratio from 
that industry is ¨Q. Subsequently, the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio is computed as follows: Q_Adj = 
sign(¨Q)*sqrt(|¨Q|), where sign(¨Q) is the sign of the difference between Tobin’s Q ratio related to every 
company and the median of the ratio corresponding to the industry. We used the median instead of mean 
because the data were not normally distributed. 
Therefore, we use several control variables in order to take into account the influence of another factors 
which could affect the value of the company. Thus, we use as control variable the total assets of the company 
(logarithmic values) to control for firm size. Fama and Jensen, 1983 noticed the fact that large companies are 
more diversified than small companies, thus encountering a reduced risk of bankruptcy. In order to control for 
the level of indebtedness, we consider as control variable the leverage. Large companies could support a higher 
level of indebtedness than small companies due to the transparency in the information flow to the creditors. 
However, indebtedness could determine the overinvestment problem (Jensen, 1986) or the underinvestment 
problem (Myers, 1977). We use sales growth to control for growth opportunities. McConnell and Servaes, 1995 
identified the fact that the market value of long-term debt divided by the replacement value of assets could 
determine an increase of value for ‘low-growth’ companies or a decrease of value for ‘high-growth’ companies 
due to the monitoring function induced by indebtedness (to distinguish between these two types of companies, 
the authors used the firm’ price-to-operating-earnings (P/E) ratio). We control for the age of the company 
through the number of years since listing on the BSE (logarithmic values). Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006; 
Balasubramanian, Black, and Khanna, 2010 mentioned the fact that younger firms are likely to be faster-
growing and perhaps more intangible asset intensive, which can lead to higher Tobin’s Q ratio. 
3.2. Empirical specification 
The empirical research involves estimation of several multivariate regression models for panel data, 
unbalanced, with fixed effects, by considering the following general specification: 
Yit = Į + ȕXit + ȖZit + uit; i = 1, ..., N; t =1, ..., T       (1) 
within Y is the dependent variable, respectively firm value, X is the vector of variables concerning the financial 
intermediaries’ ownership, and Z is the vector of control variables. The index i signifies the cross-sectional 
dimension, respectively the companies listed on the BSE, while the index t expresses the temporal dimension, 
respectively the period 2007-2011. Within the pale of fixed-effects regression models although intercept is 
different between sections, it is invariant in time.  
Furthermore, in order to identify possible nonlinear relationships between financial intermediaries’ 
ownership and firm value, we will estimate another set of regression models by considering the following 
general specification: 
Yit = Į + ȕXit + ȕ’X2it + ȖZit + uit; i = 1, ..., N; t =1, ..., T     (2) 
within towards the general specification (1), in the aforementioned specification come out the term X2 being the 
vector of variables concerning the financial intermediaries’ ownership, but the values are squared. Thus, if the 
parameters ȕ and ȕ’ record different signs, there result nonlinear relationships between financial intermediaries’ 
ownership and firm value, but imposing statistically significant relationships. Therefore, in order to identify the 
inflection points, the partial derivatives Y/X are considered zero, thus resolving for X. 
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4. Empirical results and discussion 
4.1. Sample characteristics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all the variables employed in the empirical research. Therefore, we 
notice the fact that the mean ownership (11 percent) related to the five Regional Funds of Private Property 
(SIF-s) is higher than the mean ownership (4.58 percent) corresponding to the Investment Funds and Financial 
Investment Service Companies (SSIF-s). Likewise, by considering that the variable measuring the sum of 
shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries (FinIntermed_Share) comprise in 2011 the Property 
Fund (FP) ownership, the mean value is no longer significantly affected due to the lower ownership of FP.  
Table 2 Summary statistics  
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
Q_Adj 334 0.089281 0.000000 -0.811778 1.870603 0.570688 
SIF_Share 334 11.00270 0.000000 0.000000 96.65130 0.236559 
SSIF_Share 334 4.586900 0.000000 0.000000 87.41250 0.145758 
FinIntermed_Share 334 15.79900 0.000000 0.000000 96.65130 0.264133 
Ln(TotalAssets) 334 8.241298 8.193217 6.977173 1.052934 0.610849 
Leverage 334 0.387540 0.353737 0.006916 1.940834 0.285651 
ǻSales 334 0.070588 0.045353 -0.913607 2.503076 0.356558 
YearsListed 334 0.968339 1.041393 0.000000 1.204120 0.253036 
 
Table 3 shows the frequency of the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries over 
the period 2007-2011. Thereby, by considering the mean values, only in 11 companies out of the selected 
sample, the financial intermediaries’ ownership is over the threshold of 50 percent. Besides, the most of 
financial intermediaries’ ownership is in the first range (0-10 percent). Mínguez-Vera and Martín-Ugedo, 2005 
exhibited the following findings regarding the institutional ownership by countries, identified based on authors’ 
research for 1999 and Gerke, Bank, and Steiger, 2003 for 1995: France (8 percent), Germany (30.3 percent), 
Japan (35.8 percent), Spain (28 percent), U.K. (50.1 percent), and U.S. (44.5 percent). As much, relative to 
France which registers a similar administration system as Romania, in our selected sample the mean ownership 
corresponding to the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries and SIF-s is higher, with 
the exception of Investment Funds and SSIF-s. 
Table 3 The frequency of the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries (2007-2011)  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
FinIntermed_Share  
  0.0000%<=x<10.0000% 38 60.31746 42 62.68657 42 61.76471 43 63.23529 38 55.88235 
10.0000%<=x<20.0000% 9 14.28571 12 17.91045 11 16.17647 10 14.70588 15 22.05882 
20.0000%<=x<30.0000% 5 7.93651 1 1.49254 3 4.41176 3 4.41176 3 4.41176 
30.0000%<=x<40.0000% 1 1.58730 0 0.00000 0 0.00000 0 0.00000 0 0.00000 
40.0000%<=x<50.0000% 0 0.00000 1 1.49254 1 1.47059 0 0.00000 0 0.00000 
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50.0000%<=x<60.0000% 3 4.76190 3 4.47761 2 2.94118 3 4.41176 3 4.41176 
60.0000%<=x<70.0000% 1 1.58730 2 2.98507 3 4.41176 2 2.94118 2 2.94118 
70.0000%<=x<80.0000% 3 4.76190 4 5.97015 4 5.88235 5 7.35294 5 7.35294 
80.0000%<=x<90.0000% 3 4.76190 1 1.49254 1 1.47059 1 1.47059 1 1.47059 
90.0000%<=x<100.0000% 0 0.00000 1 1.49254 1 1.47059 1 1.47059 1 1.47059 
 
4.2. Regression results  
Table 4 shows the estimation results for panel least squares regression models of Tobin’s Q ratio on 
financial intermediaries’ ownership and control variables.  
Table 4 Estimation results for panel least squares regression models of Tobin’s Q ratio on financial intermediaries’ ownership and control 
variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 
0.483480 
(0.264334) 
-0.385668 
(-0.213211) 
1.366762 
(0.768979) 
1.473516 
(0.827500) 
1.010120 
(0.566485) 
1.356963 
(0.766367) 
SIF_Share 
0.692201 
(0.680551) 
3.862891** 
(2.858940) 
    
SIF_Share2 
 
 
-8.147442*** 
(-3.473622) 
    
SSIF_Share 
 
 
 3.684395*** 
(4.183465) 
4.579694*** 
(3.631215) 
  
SSIF_Share2 
 
 
  -3.824066 
(-0.991757) 
  
FinIntermed_Share 
 
 
   2.329928*** 
(3.709135) 
3.712133*** 
(4.471313) 
FinIntermed_Share2 
 
 
    -3.689939* 
(-2.512931) 
Ln(TotalAssets) 0.022878 (0.101219) 
0.138215 
(0.617432) 
-0.089714 
(-0.406603) 
-0.096404 
(-0.436707) 
-0.069204 
(-0.311908) 
-0.111206 
(-0.504827) 
Leverage 
1.075807*** 
(6.007703) 
1.069983*** 
(6.100250) 
1.102639*** 
(6.351837) 
1.104111*** 
(6.359886) 
1.113354*** 
(6.363164) 
1.094854*** 
(6.315120) 
ǻSales 0.087927 (1.131331) 
0.073555 
(0.964836) 
0.006043 
(0.077628) 
0.008949 
(0.114868) 
0.027409 
(0.353249) 
0.022043 
(0.286860) 
YearsListed 
-1.117406*** 
(-4.266938) 
-0.987051*** 
(-3.807697) 
-1.171970*** 
(-4.630344) 
-1.176528*** 
(-4.647440) 
-1.189681*** 
(-4.663219) 
-1.047952*** 
(-4.049551) 
F-statistic 3.888390*** 4.163017*** 4.378000*** 4.331229*** 4.270421*** 4.384195*** 
R-sq 0.517528 0.538926 0.547045 0.548752 0.540873 0.551760 
Adj R-sq 0.384432 0.409470 0.422092 0.422055 0.414217 0.425908 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. The t-statistic for each coefficient is reported in parentheses. N = 334. 
The description of the variables is provided in Table 1. 
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Thus, from model 2 there results the fact that the ownership of the five Regional Funds of Private Property 
(SIF-s) positively influences firm value, but up to an ownership threshold of 23.71 percent, whereupon the 
influence becomes negative. Likewise, we notice the fact that the ownership of the Investment Funds and 
Financial Investment Service Companies (SSIF-s) positively influences firm value (models 3 and 4). However, 
we could not identify any nonlinear relationship between the shareholdings of Investment Funds and SSIF-s on 
the one hand and Tobin’s Q ratio on the other hand (model 4). Further, by considering the sum of shareholdings 
of all categories of financial intermediaries, including the ownership of the Property Fund (FP) in 2011 (model 
6), we detect a positive relationship, but up to an ownership threshold of 50.3 percent, whereupon the influence 
becomes negative. By considering the influence of control variables, we notice the positive influence of 
leverage on firm value, respectively the negative relationship between the number of years since listing on the 
BSE and Tobin’s Q ratio.  
5. Summary and conclusion 
This study examines the influence of financial intermediaries’ ownership on firm value for a sample of 
companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchanghe (BSE), over the period 2007-2011. We used Tobin’s Q 
ratio to measure firm value, but we adjusted it in order to account for the industry membership diversity of the 
selected companies. We considered the ownership of the five Romanian Financial Investment Companies (SIF-
s), the ownership of the Investment Funds and Financial Investment Service Companies (SSIF-s), as well the 
sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries, including in the last the Property Fund (FP) 
ownership, but only for 2011, when the Romanian Government became minority shareholder. Therefore, by 
employing multivariate regression models for panel data, unbalanced, with fixed effects, we found that the  
ownership of the five SIF-s positively influences firm value, but up to an ownership threshold of 23.71 percent, 
whereupon the influence becomes negative. Thus, until the aforementioned ownership threshold the positive 
influence emphasizes pursuant to Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988 the presence of pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors with no business relationships with the companies. Therefore, down to the ownership 
level of 23.71 percent we could validate the active monitoring hypothesis according to which there are 
sufficient incentives inside of the five SIF-s in order to oversee corporate performance. Further, beyond the 
identified ownership threshold we distinguish the presence of pressure-sensitive institutional investors who 
have business relationships with the firms where they own shareholdings. The negative relationship noticed 
beyond the aforementioned ownership threshold highlights the conflict of interest hypothesis (Pound, 1988). 
There are cases distinguished through the ongoing contracts initiated by the Romanian Financial Investment 
Companies’ (SIF-s) managers with another companies controlled by their family members, fact which 
determined the impairment of several companies from the SIF-s’ portfolios. Thus, according to Leech, 2000 the 
power exercise is exhibited in the form of influence rather than control. By considering the ownership of the 
Investment Funds and SSIF-s, we identified a positive influence on firm value. Additionally, we found a 
nonlinear relationship between the sum of shareholdings of all categories of financial intermediaries and firm 
value, respectively a positive influence on Tobin’s Q ratio up to an ownership threshold of 50.3 percent, 
whereupon the influence becomes negative. 
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